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By Kevin L. Kliesen
(The author’s book review of  In Fed We Trust 
takes the place of our usual National Overview 
feature, which will return in the next issue.)
 
T
he nation’s economic policymakers are 
entrusted with helping to ensure eco-
nomic and financial stability.  Often, though, 
a policymaker’s thought process is clouded 
by the storm and stress of the crisis.  In his 
book In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War 
on the Great Panic (published in August 2009 
by Crown Business), the Wall Street Journal’s 
David Wessel walks us through a detailed, 
behind-the-scenes narrative that attempts to 
portray the difficulties facing Federal Reserve 
policymakers (and those in the federal 
government) as they formulated an evolving 
response to the financial crisis that roughly 
began in August 2007.  
From Page 8:
This is the story of the Bernanke Fed 
abandoning “failed paradigms” in 
order “to do what needed to be done.”  
It is a story of what the Fed saw and 
what it missed, what it did and what 
it didn’t, what it got right and what 
it got wrong.  It is a story about Ben 
Bernanke deciding to do whatever it 
takes.  Above all, it is a story about 
a handful of people—overwhelmed, 
exhausted, beseeched, besieged, con-
stantly second-guessed—who found 
themselves assigned to protect the U.S. 
economy from the worst economic 
threat of their lifetimes.
Heading into the last few months of 2009, 
it appears that these efforts have produced 
some tangible benefits:  The economic and 
financial headwinds that have hammered 
the U.S. economy over the past year or so 
appear to be calming.  Indeed, a majority 
of economists believe the recession that 
officially began sometime in December 
2007 has finally ended.  
Riders on the Storm 
As the book’s subtitle suggests, much 
of the narrative is focused on the Federal 
Reserve’s response to the financial cri-
sis—what Wessel calls the Great Panic.  
The design and implementation of these 
policy responses are seen mainly through 
the lens of Chairman Ben Bernanke 
and his key colleagues on the Federal 
Open Market Committee.  Wessel also 
added a second subtitle to the book: How the 
Federal Reserve Became the Fourth Branch 
of Government.  By this, Wessel has in mind 
the Federal Reserve’s special lending powers 
that were invoked under Section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act.  Under the auspices of 
“unusual and exigent circumstances,” the 
Federal Reserve—via the three special lend-
ing facilities named Maiden Lane I, II and 
III—helped to finance the purchase of Bear 
Stearns by JPMorgan Chase and to prevent 
the failure of American International Group 
(AIG).  Wessel also relates how Bernanke 
and other Federal Reserve officials urged the 
government’s other key economic players 
to take aggressive actions at key moments 
in the Great Panic.  These included policies 
designed to stabilize the nation’s 19 largest 
depository institutions deemed too systemi-
cally important to fail. 
In Fed We Trust is an entertaining read, 
but it is generally written from a Washington, 
D.C., and New York City perspective.  Indeed, 
the key Federal Reserve officials in the nar-
rative are Bernanke, Govs. Don Kohn and 
Kevin Warsh, and then-New York Fed Presi-
dent Tim Geithner.  Wessel refers to them 
as the four musketeers.  At times, the four 
musketeers wanted to move faster and more 
aggressively than other policymakers did.  
This created some tension with policymakers 
who advocated a more cautious approach.  
Among the latter was a group of several 
Federal Reserve District Bank presidents who 
“were determined to show their manhood by 
talking tough about inflation and economic 
rectitude.”  In perhaps the unkindest cut of 
all, those District Bank presidents, many of 
whom found intellectual support from prom-
inent academics like John Taylor of Stanford 
University, were derisively labeled “presidents 
from the flyover states” by “internal foes.”
Age of Delusion? 
Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan 
is another prominent person whom Wessel 
takes to task.  In the chapter titled “Age of 
Delusion,” Wessel argues that the Greenspan 
Fed not only kept interest rates too low for 
too long, but it ignored important warning 
signs from the booming housing market.  
Wessel is also upset that Greenspan largely 
ignored former Federal Reserve Gov. Ned 
Gramlich’s warnings about the subprime 
market.  In short, Wessel believes Greenspan 
put too much faith in the financial markets 
and financial institutions.  Some of these crit-
icisms are fairly easy to make with the benefit 
of hindsight.  Some may even be true.  For 
example, Taylor, among others, has argued 
that monetary policy was excessively easy for 
too long in 2003-2004.  But even if Wessel is 
correct in asserting that the Fed should have 
taken a more aggressive regulatory stance 
against subprime mortgages, it is difficult to 
In Fed We Trust: New Book Focuses 
on the Fed in the Eye of the Storm
The Regional Economist  |  www.stlouisfed.org   21E c O n O m y   a t   a   g l a n c E
Eleven more charts are available on the web version of this issue.  Among the areas they cover are agriculture, commercial 
banking, housing permits, income and jobs.  Much of the data is specific to the Eighth District.  To go directly to these charts, 
use this URL:  www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/2009/d/pdf/10-09-data.pdf.
U.S. AGRICULTURAL TRADE FARMING CASH RECEIPTS    



























































CIVILIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE INTEREST RATES    








NOTE:  Beginning in January 2003, household data reflect revised



























NOTE:  On Dec. 16, 2008, the FOMC set a target range for 
the federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25 percent.  The observations 
plotted since then are the midpoint of the range (0.125 percent).
INFLATION-INDEXED TREASURY YIELD SPREADS RATES ON FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES ON SELECTED DATES
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NOTE:  Each bar is a one-quarter growth rate (annualized); 
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conceive that this would have made much 
of a difference in mitigating the Great 
Panic.  If there is empirical evidence to the 
contrary, Wessel does not cite it.
Moral Hazard and Other Issues 
In Fed We Trust is an admirable effort 
to clarify how policymakers cope with 
the massive amounts of uncertainty 
during periods of turmoil.  Indeed, one 
of the lessons, as Wessel recounts, is that 
economic conditions can change rapidly 
and be contrary to the expectations of 
policymakers.  Most policymakers know 
this and design their policies accordingly.  
Yet, while this book provides key insights 
into the policy process during the height 
of a panic, Wessel gives short-shrift to the 
moral hazard and potential inflationary 
consequences raised by, among others, the 
District Bank presidents from so-called 
flyover states, who do not fare well in this 
narrative.  What has yet to be determined, 
and, admittedly, what Wessel and others 
cannot know with certainty, at this point 
is the legacy of the Federal Reserve’s inno-
vative responses to the crisis. 
In his new book on the Federal Reserve’s response 
to the recent financial panic, author David Wessel writes 
that Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke (above) and other key 
Fed officials wanted to move faster and more aggres-
sively than did other policymakers during the so-called 
Great Panic.
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